A text-independent speaker authentication system for mobile devices by Thullier, Florentin et al.
cryptography
Article
A Text-Independent Speaker Authentication System
for Mobile Devices
Florentin Thullier *, Bruno Bouchard * and Bob-Antoine J. Menelas *
Department of Computer Science and Mathematics, Université du Québec à Chicoutimi,
Chicoutimi, QC G7H 2B1, Canada
* Correspondence: florentin.thullier1@uqac.ca (F.T.); bruno_bouchard@uqac.ca (B.B.);
bob-antoine-jerry_menelas@uqac.ca (B.-A.J.M.)
Received: 6 July 2017; Accepted: 19 September 2017; Published: 22 September 2017
Abstract: This paper presents a text independent speaker authentication method adapted to
mobile devices. Special attention was placed on delivering a fully operational application, which
admits a sufficient reliability level and an efficient functioning. To this end, we have excluded
the need for any network communication. Hence, we opted for the completion of both the
training and the identification processes directly on the mobile device through the extraction of
linear prediction cepstral coefficients and the naive Bayes algorithm as the classifier. Furthermore,
the authentication decision is enhanced to overcome misidentification through access privileges that
the user should attribute to each application beforehand. To evaluate the proposed authentication
system, eleven participants were involved in the experiment, conducted in quiet and noisy
environments. Public speech corpora were also employed to compare this implementation to
existing methods. Results were efficient regarding mobile resources’ consumption. The overall
classification performance obtained was accurate with a small number of samples. Then, it appeared
that our authentication system might be used as a first security layer, but also as part of a multilayer
authentication, or as a fall-back mechanism.
Keywords: speaker authentication; text independent; mobile devices; LPCCs; naive Bayes;
voice; security
1. Introduction
Nowadays, mobile devices play an important role in humans’activities. As announced by the
Gartner Institute, smartphone sales surpassed one billion units in 2014 [1], and everywhere and at all
times, people carry their mobile devices [2] (considered as a vital piece of their life) [3]. People store
private information, like pictures and recordings, and also secret data (i.e., emails, bank account) on
their devices. However, they generally do not really pay attention regarding the safety of this secret
content [4]. Within a mobile device context, authentication remains the first entry point for security.
Indeed, such a mechanism aims at protecting the digital identity of users.
In the last decade, multiple authentication methods have been designed and evaluated.
Mobile devices often only offer authentications that involve recalling a piece of information such
as the PIN code. However, they concede several drawbacks. For instance, it was accounted that
half of the population leaves the mobile devices unlocked [5]. They evaluate that entering a PIN
code includes loads of burden for each time the cell phone must be opened [5]. Besides, it is
realized that users experience difficulties recalling all passwords that they utilize these days [6].
Unmistakably, these practices may lead to a tremendous effect on the security of cell phones. Doing so,
people’s authentication usage may create important dangers for the security that a method offers
at first [7–9]. Recently, biometric authentication mechanisms such as fingerprint, ear shape or gait
recognition were enabled on mobile devices [10–13]. These systems chiefly exploit the uniqueness
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of the user’s physiological or behavioural trait. In the same way, speaker authentication refers to
the process of accepting or rejecting a speaker that claims identity. Such schemes are also advised as
biometrics since they concentrate on both vocal qualities delivered by the discourse and the discourse
itself. These components rely upon the measurement of the vocal tract, mouth and nasal depressions,
yet additionally depend on voice pitch, talking style and dialect [14].
Speaker validation frameworks might be composed by two driving strategies: text-dependent
and text independent [15,16]. In a text-dependent authentication, the person has to say a predefined
pass-phrase, seen as a voice secret word. This predefined phrase is utilized both for the enrolment and
the recognizable proof process. For example, on the Android mobile operating system, the expression
”Ok Google” is exploited as a predefined pass-expression. It has to be vocalized for both enrolment
and identification. By contrast, text independent methods are capable of authenticating the speaker
regardless of the pronounced expression. Nowadays, speaker verification strategies offered on mobile
devices deeply rely on matching templates methods realized through cloud computing. Because of that,
additional costs may be associated. Nevertheless, such solutions can still be considered as being
inexpensive considering that they do not necessitate any extra sensors. Conversely, since manufacturers
have pushed fingerprint systems to the forefront of the mobile device authentication mechanism
scene, they tend to become usual. Nevertheless, fingerprints admit a major drawback since they
are impossible to use in countries having hard weather conditions as people wear gloves in winter.
In that sense, a speaker authentication approach may be a convenient way to resolve such an issue.
Moreover, these authentication systems provide an adequate acceptance percentage. They seem to
be less invasive than fingerprint or retina scan [8,17]. Moreover, these approaches may assume a
noteworthy part in everyday life as some applications, like e-commerce solutions, attendance systems,
mobile banking or forensics, need to be secured.
Experiments have proven that some proposed speaker recognition and identification systems
achieve accurate results [18–22]. In spite of their effectiveness, few of such mechanisms have been
exploited in real life. They are mostly machine-centred implementations. Additionally, the significant
number of users who still do not secure the entrance to their cell phones [5] reveals a need for novel
methods mainly focused on a human-centred design that must take into account the diversity of user
profiles and usages [23]. The current initiative addresses these observations. The contribution of this
paper is to expose the design of a Text independent Speaker Authentication (TiSA) system suitable for
mobile devices while focusing on users’needs. The choice of a text independent solution is motivated
by a relevant usage when there are social interactions. Indeed, saying “Ok Google” in the middle
of a conversation may be disruptive, while a text independent solution is capable of identifying and
authenticating the owner of the mobile device all along the conversation without any care for what is
being said. Moreover, a recent study [24] highlighted that 62% of the panel of Android users rarely
employ the voice assistant feature, and most of them have declared that ”they feel uncomfortable
talking to their technology, especially in public”.
The system we propose in this work is a mobile application designed to be extremely convenient
for the user [25]. It allows them to forget that they are using a voice-based authentication mechanism.
In order to achieve such an authentication, our approach relies on Linear Prediction Cepstral
Coefficients (LPCCs) and the naive Bayes algorithm for patterns’ classification. Whereas authentication
methods usually either grant or deny access to the whole content of the phone, a privileged access
is also introduced, in this work, to be able to face false positive and negative authentications.
Here, some accesses, based on a simple evaluation of the user’s location and the presence of a headset,
may be granted or rejected. To produce an efficient system, we opted for low complexity algorithms,
and we avoid network communications by achieving both the training and the identification on the
mobile device itself.
The contribution of the paper is the following. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature about speaker
identification and verification systems. The third one describes the proposed approach. Section 4
describes the experiments we conducted in order to evaluate the reliability, as well as the efficiency of
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such an implementation. Section 5 exposes and discusses the results we obtained. Finally, Section 6
draws the conclusion, and Section 7 provides future works.
2. Related Work
In the past few years, multiple algorithms have been developed to authenticate a speaking person.
Most of these algorithms focused on the extraction of features and classifications. In this section,
we will briefly review proposed techniques, as well as the evaluation of their adaptability regarding
the mobile context. We will also review speaker authentication techniques designed to be run on
mobile devices.
One of the first works of this category was proposed by Reynolds and Rose [20]. The authors
suggested the use of Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) as features and a Gaussian
Mixture Model (GMM) to authenticate the speaker. MFCCs characterize adequately the envelope
of the short-time power spectrum of the signal. In spite of being sufficiently resilient to noisy
conditions, their applicability in the mobile context is limited as they monopolize many resources [26].
The argumentation that supports this method comes from an experiment with a subset of the “KING
speech” [27] database. This database provides utterances from speaker conversations over both
signal-to-noise radio channels and narrow-band telephone channels. It has been observed that a large
number of unlabelled classes of the sample distribution may be encoded as a linear combination of
Gaussian basis functions. An accuracy of 80.8% was obtained for 49 telephone speech samples of
15 s. The authors hypothesized that this model should be computationally inexpensive and easy to
implement on real-time platforms. However, the main drawback of their method comes from the
initialization of the training process as several parameters such as the mean, covariance and prior of
each distribution have to fit the data. Such a process may be achieved through several costly methods
like a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) or a binary k-means clustering algorithm. In that sense, although
the identification process may certainly be efficient when used in a mobile device context, the training
phase would probably be computationally overly expensive.
A second text independent method for speaker authentication has been described in [18].
This methods relies on a back-propagation neural network having LPC (Linear Prediction Coefficient)
parameters as input features, to predict utterances. The use of the back-propagation method aims to
optimize the distribution of weights between neuron layers. Doing so, it becomes possible for the
neural network to correctly map arbitrary inputs to outputs. The decision process is achieved by
associating each speaker to an utterance. In a database having 25 speech samples of different languages,
the identification accuracy was about 85.74%. With this promising achievement, Kumar et al. [18]
have concluded that the proposed method would be appropriate and reliable. Nevertheless, we may
note that the theoretical complexity of a standard back-propagation neural network training phase
is O(nmhkoi). Here, n are training samples; m refers to features; k are hidden layers, each containing
h neurons; o refers to output neurons; and i is the number of iterations [28]. This suggests that the
computation time is still overly expensive considering the limited capacity of mobile devices.
Another text independent method for speaker authentication has been proposed by Nair and
Salam [19]. This method resorts to both LPCs and LPCCs to compare their strength. The use of the
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [29] algorithm allows to decide about the best option. The TIMIT (Texas
Instruments and Massachusetts Institute of Technology) speech database was used for the experiment.
This corpus of American-English Speakers (AESs) counts 630 speech signals. The achieved accuracy is
around 92.2% with LPCs. With derivative cepstral coefficients, it climbed to 97.3%. As expected, the
association of LPCCs to the DTW algorithm offers an accurate and reliable solution. Since DTW requires
a quadratic complexity both in terms of time and memory usage (i.e., O(n2)) [30], it appears that it
may not be the most suitable solution to achieve speaker authentication, directly on the mobile device.
Nevertheless, real speaker authentication scenarios usually imply few distinct samples. In that sense,
DTW for decision-making still remains an acceptable choice for such an authentication mechanism on
limited-performance devices especially when considering other fields of research such as in [31,32].
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The growing interest in deep leaning approaches observed in recent years forced us to question
its suitability as regards a speaker identification task. Lee et al. [33] have shown that Convolutional
Deep Belief Network (CDBN) features trained with an SVM classifier have outperformed MFCC
features trained with a GMM (respectively for the method described in [34] when the number of
training examples was small (i.e., 1–2 utterances per speaker). However, with a greater number of
training samples (i.e., 5–8 utterances per speaker), the results remained similar (i.e., around a 99%
accuracy). Moreover, since deep learning algorithms yet remain costly in terms of computational
power and processing time, the training process is always achieved on the server-side [35]. However,
with the recent partnership developed between Movidius, the leader in low-power machine vision for
connected devices, and Google, next generation mobile devices may embed a chip dedicated to the
computation of complex machine learning algorithms such as deep neural networks [36]. Then, in the
present situation, it appears that such an approach may not be an adequate solution according to
our needs.
To the best of our knowledge, it seems that a limited number of text independent speaker
authentication methods have been implemented on mobile devices. For instance, to tackle TiSA
solutions in noisy conditions, Vuppala et al. [37] suggested a recognition method that exploits various
speech enhancements in order to enhance overall performances. However, realized evaluations, with
the TIMIT database, were performed with various simulated noises.
On the other hand, Brunet et al. have proposed in [38] a TiSA method dedicated to mobile devices.
This method starts by extracting MFCC features from speech samples. With this information, a Vector
Quantization (VQ) method allows to construct a reference model. Euclidean distances between stored
centroids and tested samples enable to accept or to reject the attempt based on a given threshold.
To evaluate the proposed method, the Sphinx dataset [39] that counts 16 utterances of AESs, as well as
a personal database are exploited. For their personal database, samples for training and testing were
collected with a mobile device. Being implemented as a stand-alone biometric system, the Equal Error
Rate (EER) was the only performance indicator. Hence, they obtained better performances on their
database (4.52 of EER at best) than the ones on the public database (5.35 of EER at best). As usually
observed for such an approach, the observed results are deeply dependent on the initial parameters,
like the number of centroids.
With this short analysis of the literature, we observe that few TiSA methods have considered the
limited capabilities of mobile devices. This paper introduces a user-centred TiSA system for mobile
devices. Special attention was paid to its usability and the effectiveness of the training, as well as the
identification steps in order to compute both of them directly on the mobile device. As a matter of fact,
we selected low-computational cost algorithms that do not require any parameter to optimize with
other expensive techniques regarding processing time, as long as they offer an accurate identification.
3. Proposed Speaker Authentication System
In this paper, we propose a new authentication system for mobile devices based on speakers,
which is text independent. This system is fully stand-alone because all the processing is done directly
on the mobile device. Therefore, our approach does not require any heavy (and costly) client/server
platform. More precisely, the architecture of our system is composed of three fundamental processes,
as you can see in Figure 1. The first process consists of extracting a selected set of individual voice
features from an audio signal coming from the speaker, in order to build a dataset. The second process
takes that dataset as input and performs a training exploiting a naive Bayes classifier. Finally, the third
process computes the authentication decision and returns true or false.
The objective of our system is to enhance the standard speaker verification mechanism in order to
increase the confidence rate. To do that, we propose to grant specific access privileges to the user by
evaluating two discriminant variables. The first variable is the actual location of the person versus the
one defined beforehand. The second variable is the presence (or not) of the headset, which consists
simply of checking if it is plugged into the mobile device. Of course, using a headset with a built-in
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microphone proceeding to a noise reduction will decrease the possibility of a user being unwillingly
authenticated though replay attacks [40].
Digitized 
audio signal
	


 

Voice samples 
dataset
Access 
type
Figure 1. Flowchart of our proposed speaker authentication system.
3.1. Input
Each audio file is recorded with a 16-bit signed integer PCM encoding format using bi-channels.
The sampling rate of this kind of audio file is fixed to 44.1 kHz.
3.2. Pre-Processing
This section will describe the pre-processing phase of our approach. This phase consists of two
main steps, which are voice activity detection and audio normalization.
3.2.1. Voice Activity Detection
The first step of the pre-processing phase consists of trimming the audio file to remove every
silence interval in order to keep only speech segments. To achieve that, we defined a fixed threshold
close to zero (i.e., 0.0001). We use that threshold to identify the sections of the input signal that we
need to remove (i.e., the ones that are close to it). Then, we apply the autocorrelation function rx(t, k)
introduced by Sadjadi and Hansen [41] onto a windowed audio segment sw(n) of the complete input
signal s(n) given by,
rx(t, x) =
N−1
∑
n=0
sw(n)w(n)sw(n + k)w(n + k)
N−1
∑
n=0
w(n)w(n + k)
, (1)
where t and k are frame and autocorrelation lag indices, respectively, and w(n) is a Hamming window
given by,
w(n) =
 0.54− 0.46 cos(
2πn
Nw − 1
), 0 ≤ n ≤ Nw − 1
0, otherwise.
, (2)
where the length (Nw) is based on the frequency of the signal.
As we can see on Figure 2, for each processed segment sw(n), if the mean value of the computed
coefficients that result from the autocorrelation function gets close to the fixed threshold, then
the segment is identified as a silence interval, and thus, it is removed.
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Figure 2. The first signal is the raw input where silence areas are highlighted. The second is the output
of the same signal after the silence removal process.
3.2.2. Audio Normalization
After the silence removal phase, we perform a peak normalization. The objective is to modify
the gain of the input to the highest peak of the signal, uniformly. Normally, this process allows
ensuring that the highest peak remains at zero decibels relative to Full Scale (dBFS), which is the
loudest level allowed in a digital system. It should be noted that the entire signal is adjusted so the
original information is not affected. In addition, peak normalization ensures that the audio signal will
not clip in any ways. The result of this process is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. The left signal is the input signal, and the right one is the same signal with peak normalization,
where the same sequence is highlighted on both signals.
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3.3. Feature Extraction
Extracting discriminating features from an audio signal containing the voice of a speaker is not
trivial. The voice is considered as a very particular signal containing rich information about the
speaker. Therefore, extracting features from the speech constitutes a core component of both speaker
identification and authentication systems. In our approach, we propose to exploit Linear Prediction
Cepstral Coefficients (LPCCs) to perform the features extraction. Such coefficients are directly derived
from the linear prediction analysis, which aims to estimate the relevant characteristics from a speech
signal [42]. Using LPCCs allows us to provide very accurate estimates of the speech parameters
while keeping a good computation speed [26]. Mobile devices have limited computational resources
compared to a standard computer; thus, choosing a method that required low computational power is
essential. Each step from a pre-processed signal to the obtaining voice characteristics that are saved in
a dataset are summarized in Figure 4.
Hamming window
Preprocessed 
audio signal
Voice samples 
dataset
Crosscorrelation
Linear Predictive 
Analysis 
(LPC Algorithm)
LP Coefficients 
derivation
LPCCs
Figure 4. Flowchart of the feature extraction process.
To compute the LP analysis, we have implemented the Linear Predictive Coding algorithm. It was
designed to exploit the redundancy present in the speech signal by assuming that each sample may be
approximated by a linear sum of the past speech samples (p). Hence, the predicted sample Sp(n) may
be represented as,
Sp(n) =
p
∑
k=1
aks(n− k) , (3)
where a(k) are the Linear Prediction Coefficients (LPCs), s(n − k) are past outputs and p is the
prediction order. In our case, the speech signal is multiplied by an overlapped Hamming window of
25 ms to get a windowed speech segment Sw(n) as,
sw(n) = w(n)s(n) , (4)
where w(n) is the windowing sequence given in Equation (2). The error between the actual sample
and the predicted one e(n) may be expressed as,
e(n) = sw(n)−
p
∑
k=1
aksw(n− k) . (5)
The main objective of the LP analysis is to compute the LP coefficients that minimize this prediction
error. To this end, our system exploits the autocorrelation method that is usually preferred since it is
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computationally more efficient and more stable than the covariance one [43]. Thus, the total prediction
error E is given as,
E =
∞
∑
n=−∞
e2(n) =
∞
∑
n=−∞
(
sw(n)−
p
∑
k=1
aksw(n− k)
)2
. (6)
The values of a(k) that minimize this total prediction error may be computed by finding,
δE
δak
= 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ p . (7)
Thus, each ak gives p equations with p unknown variables. Equation (8) offers the solution to find
LP coefficients,
∞
∑
n=−∞
sw(n− i)sw(n) =
p
∑
k=1
a(k)
∞
∑
n=−∞
sw(n− i)sw(n− k), 1 ≤ i ≤ p . (8)
Consequently, it is possible to express the linear Equation (8) in terms of the autocorrelation
function R(i) as follows,
R(i) =
Nw
∑
n=i
sw(n)sw(n− i), 0 ≤ i ≤ p , (9)
where Nw is the length of the window. Then, by substituting values from Equation (9) in Equation (8)
with the autocorrelation function R(i) = R(−i), we obtain the following equation,
p
∑
k=1
R(|i− k|)ak = R(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ p . (10)
The set of linear equations is expressed by the relation Ra = r and may be represented in matrix
form as,
R

R(0) R(1) · · · R(p− 1)
R(1) R(0) · · · R(p− 2)
...
...
. . .
...
R(p− 1) R(p− 2) · · · R(0)
a

a1
a2
...
ap
=
r

R(1)
R(2)
...
R(p)
, (11)
where a is the vector of LP coefficients and r is the autocorrelation. The resulting matrix is a Toeplitz
matrix where all elements along a given diagonal are equal.
Towards the computation of the LP coefficient ak, it is possible to derive cepstral coefficients cn
directly through the following relationship,
cn =
n−1
∑
k=1
akcn−k + an, 1 < n ≤ p , (12)
where p refers to the prediction order.
It is known that speaker recognition requires more cepstral coefficients than speech recognition,
which employs around 15 of them. Although it was pointed out that increasing the number of such
coefficients does not affect the recognition [44], we suggest using 20 LPCCs to preserve a relatively
good computation speed.
3.4. Classification
In the literature, several classification algorithms have been used for speaker recognition
(i.e., GMM, ANN, etc.). Nevertheless, in our context, we needed an algorithmic approach requiring
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low computational resources. It is well known that naive Bayes classifiers are fast, very effective
and easy to implement. This method consists of a supervised and statistical learning algorithm for
classification, which computes the conditional probabilities of the different classes given the value of
attributes. At the end, it selects the class with the highest conditional probability. Table 1 shows the
formal complexity evaluations (time and space) of the naive Bayes classifier [45].
Table 1. Naive Bayes time and space complexities, given k features for both training and testing operations [45].
Operation Time Space
Training on n samples O(nk) O(k)
Testing on m samples O(mk) Θ(1)
More precisely, the method works as follows (see Figure 5). Once the feature extraction process is
completed, a set of samples denoted s1, s2, . . . , si with their associated class labels cs1 , cs2 , . . . , csi , where
csi ∈ Ω = {c1, c2, . . . , ci} is computed. Each sample has k features (i.e., LPCCs) represented by floating
numbers (with k = 20), which are denoted as a1, a2, . . . , an. The goal of the classifier is to use these
samples to build a model (in the training phase) that will be exploited to predict the label of the class
cp for any future sample (i.e., the identification phase). Figure 5 shows a simplified block diagram of
this process.
Trained model
Naïve Bayes
classifier
Training
Predicted 
voice sample
Identification decision
	

Figure 5. Flowchart of the classification process.
The algorithm strongly relies on the Bayes theorem and imposes two assumptions.
Firstly, all features a1, . . . , an should be independent for a given class c. This is the class-conditional
independence. Secondly, all features a1, . . . , an should be directly dependent on their assigned class c.
Given that, it is possible to describe the classifier as,
P(c|a1, a2, . . . , an) =
P(c)
n
∏
i=1
P(ai|c)
P(a1, a2, . . . , an)
. (13)
Since P(a1, a2, . . . , an) is common for a certain sample, it may be ignored in the classification
process. As a result, we can derive Equation (13) to predict the class c of a given sample during the
identification phase as follows,
c = arg max
c∈Ω
P(c)
n
∏
i=1
P(ai|c) . (14)
However, as we obtain the LP coefficients through an autocorrelation method, resulting LPCCs
remain strongly dependent and, consequently, violate the independence assumption of the naive
Bayes classifier. Nevertheless, Zhang [46] has demonstrated that such a condition is not necessary
to satisfy in practical situations. Indeed, no matter how strong dependencies among attributes are,
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naive Bayes can still be optimal if these are distributed evenly in class or if they cancel each other out.
Moreover, we have observed that the distribution of our features, for all classes, when compared to
their frequency, follows a normal distribution. Hence, it is possible to assume a valuable classification
rate with naive Bayes according to the supposed quality of the LPCCs.
3.5. Decision-Making
The decision-making process (granting access or not) is a crucial phase in our system. This process
is illustrated in detail in Figure 6. It may lead to two kinds of errors. First, it may result in a false
negative, which means that the system fails to identify a genuine user. Secondly, it may result in a false
positive, which means granting access to a non-authorized user. While a false negative authentication
does not compromise the security or the privacy of the user’s data, it constitutes a huge source of
frustration. In that case (false negative), the authentication process has to be redone, or a fall-back
mechanism (i.e., a PIN number) must be used. On the other hand, a false positive authentication poses
a serious vulnerability issue. Besides, speaker authentication systems have limitations that may also
lead to security threats. For instance, they are vulnerable to voice imitation or false authentication
exploiting legitimate voice records.
Voice recognition 
decision
Recognized? Access = public
Get current location
YES
Location inside given 
radius of predefined location?
Access = protected
Headset 
plugged?
Access = private
NO
NO
YES
NO
Get headset 
state
Get current 
location
YES
Figure 6. Flowchart of the decision-making process.
To address these vulnerability issues, we propose to introduce the notion of access privileges
to prevent against misidentification. First, the user needs to select the privilege preferences for each
application on his/her mobile device. Three types of setting may be selected: public, protected or
private. Of course, a user logged with public privileges will only be allowed access to non-critical
content and applications. A user logged with protected privileges will have access to most of the
content, but with some restriction on sensitive data or applications (i.e., bank account). Finally, a user
logged with private privileges will have access to all the content of the mobile device.
Now, the question is: how to choose which level of privileges to grant to the user based on
his/her voice identification. Our system selects the safest level to grant by evaluating the result of the
identification process. If the voice does not match at all with any users of the device, the system allows
a public access. In the case of a false negative, the user will have to repeat the authentication process to
get better privileges, but he/she still can use the public applications. If the voice authentication process
finds a match in the dataset, a protected access is granted, and then, the current location of the device
is fetched. Thereafter, the system check if the device is actually in what we call “a trusted location”.
These trusted locations are predefined by the user (i.e., home, work, etc.). The acceptable radius of
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the location may be adjusted, but for our prototype, we used a radius of 200 and 500 m. This double
validation (i.e., voice and location) allows the system to be much more robust against fraudulent
authentication attempts. Indeed, the system is not perfect, and there are still risks. For instance, people
from the same family or co-workers are well aware and often share most of the usual locations of the
user. To minimize these risks, we offer yet another verification process. In order to be granted a private
access level, the user must use a headset to identify himself/herself to the device, and all previous
verification must be satisfied. Thus, the system checks if the headset is plugged into the device,
providing extra microphones that enhance the accuracy of the voice recognition. These microphones
are closer to the mouth and therefore they provide better noise filtering than the built-in microphone
of the mobile device. By adopting this strategy, we think that the false positive rate will considerably
decreased. Of course, the proposed approach is experimental, but it is easy to foresee how it could be
standardized for all mobile devices.
We believe that all three suggested privacy options will allow a certain flexibility in the access of
the mobile device. Indeed, we provide a means to define an appropriate level of restriction since each
user has many different considerations according to what piece of information he/she has on his/her
phone that is important as regards confidentiality or not. Users are thus able to tune the system to
make the decision-making more or less restrictive and to best fit their personal needs.
4. Experiments
The authentication system proposed in this paper has been tested with 11 speakers, which were
students recruited at our university. We designed an experiment aiming to assess the effectiveness of
the system. In this experiment, each participant was asked to use the developed system for authenticate
himself/herself on a provided device. Each device was equipped with a headset plugged. We tested
the system in two different environmental contexts. First, the training phase was completed, for each
participant, in a quiet environment, limiting the noise. Thereafter, an authentication attempt has
been tried in the same quiet environment. In order to test the robustness of the system, a second
authentication attempt was performed in a noisy environment.
4.1. Participants
For the experiment, 11 students have been recruited, including seven males and four females,
aged from 19–36 years. All participants were native French speakers. However, some participants
had distinctive accents, such as Canadian French and Hexagonal French. All of them were familiar
with iOS and/or Android and owned at least one recent mobile device (i.e., smartphone or tablet).
Finally, nine of the participants used, on a regular basis, an unlocking mechanism for their smart
device (PIN: 4, pattern: 2, fingerprint: 3), and fingerprint users either had a PIN code or a pattern as
fall-back mechanism.
4.2. Data Collection
The prototype of our text independent system (Figure 7 shows a screenshot) was implemented on
an Android platform as an independent application requiring a 4.0.1 version (or higher) of the mobile
operating system. Each volunteer carried out the experiment using the same smartphone. The chosen
model was a LG Nexus 5 running Android 6.0.1 with a Snapdragon 800 Quad-core at 2.3 GHz CPU
and 2 GB of RAM. They also used the same headset (i.e., Bose SoundTrue I), and they performed the
experiment in the same conditions (i.e., a room and a public place).
For the first part of the experiment, a quiet room (i.e., meeting room) was selected to perform the
training and the first attempt of identification in a quiet environment. Thereafter, the participants were
asked to move to the university’s cafeteria at a proper time to proceed to the second attempt in a noisy
environment. We measured the level of sound in each environment before the test session in order
to control the conditions. For that, we exploited a sound level meter embedded in the application.
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In the quiet room, the average level of sound was 16.5 dB. In the cafeteria (i.e., the noisy environment),
the sound level reached 95 dB.
Figure 7. Screen captures of the Android application.
4.3. Procedure
In the beginning, participants were introduced to the experimental procedure, and the current
position was added to the trusted location list.
Then, training participant voices were the first phase of the experiment. To complete such an
operation, a text was randomly selected in a database and displayed on the screen of the device.
Participants were instructed to wear the headset and to familiarize themselves with the content.
Once they were ready, participants were advised to start the recording by themselves and, next, to
begin reading the text aloud. The record was automatically stopped after one minute by the application,
and participants were warned through both a vibration and a text-to-speech synthesis system. At that
point, participants were asked to wait until the end of the computation. In the meantime, the main
recorded file was split into 10-s chunks, 6 instances per class in total. Each set of features from each
instance was written in the dataset, which was used to create the training model of the naive Bayes
classifier, as described previously. Finally, participants were advised of the completion of the process
thanks to a pop-up message.
At the end of the training process, the authentication process starts. This procedure was performed
twice. In the first place, participants were asked to wear the headset and to pronounce the locution of
their choice in the quiet environment. In the second place, they were requested to execute the same
task in the noisy environment. Insofar as there was no restriction on the locution that had to be said,
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participants were able to use either two different expressions or the same one for the two authentication
sessions. Since every authentication attempt was performed in the same place, our decision-making
has always stated that users stood in a trusted location. Therefore, we have mocked a location that was
not considered as a trusted one afterwards, in order to verify the reliability of our technique. Figure 8
summarizes the proceedings of the experiment we conducted using a sequence diagram.
Finally, in the last step of the experiment, participants were given feedback about their habits
concerning authentication on their own device, as well as their opinion as regards the proposed system.
Figure 8. Sequence diagram of the experiment.
5. Results and Discussion
5.1. Speech Corpora
In this research, we have evaluated the performance of our system by exploiting two additional
speech corpora for comparison purposes with the dataset we suggested. The first one is the Ted-LIUM
(Laboratoire d’Informatique de l’Université du Mans) corpus, which was proposed by Rousseau et al. [47].
It includes a total of 1495 audio files extracted from TED talks, where all speeches are English-based
with multiple distinct accents. These records are mono-channel, and they are encoded in 16-bit
signed integer PCM at a 16-kHz sampling rate. Although the corpus was published using the NIST
Sphere format (SPH), we required converting the whole files into Waveform Audio File Format (WAV).
Furthermore, we took care of removing the first fourth frame of each file, as they correspond to the talk
opening sequence. The second speech corpus that we have exploited in this research is a subset of the
TIMIT corpus, which has been suggested by Garofolo et al. [48]. Such a subset contains 10 broadband
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recording files for 16 English-based speakers. Such provided files are also mono-channel and encoded
in 16-bit integer PCM at a 16-kHz sampling rate.
5.2. Classification Performance Metrics
Since classification let us predict to which registered speaker a given utterance corresponds,
it is important to evaluate the performance of our system thanks to representative metrics. To this
end, the accuracy is probably the most dominant measure in the literature, because of its simplicity.
This measure provides the ratio between the correct number of predictions and the total number of
cases given as,
accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
, (15)
where TP and TN refer to true positive and true negative predictions, respectively, and the total
additionally includes false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) predictions.
Despite its popularity, accuracy alone does not typically provide enough information to evaluate
the robustness of prediction outcomes. Indeed, accuracy does not compensate for results that may
be expected by luck. Indeed, a high accuracy does not necessarily reflect an indicator of a high
classification performance. This is the accuracy paradox. For instance, in a predictive classification
setting, predictive models with a given level of accuracy may have greater predictive power than
models with higher accuracy. In that sense, as suggested by Ben-David [49], we decided to provide
Cohen’s kappa evaluation metric, as well. This measure takes into account such a paradox and remains
a more relevant metric in multiclass classification evaluations such as our system. The kappa measure
is given by,
kappa =
Po − Pe
1− Pe
, (16)
where Po and Pe are the observed and the expected probabilities, respectively.
5.3. Results Obtained
The performance of our proposed system was evaluated according to several analyses. First of all,
the results of the experiment that we described previously are shown in Table 2. In this evaluation,
we have exploited testing instances we obtained over our experiment for both quiet and noisy
environments. Thanks to such achieved results, it is possible to observe that our system yields
an acceptable identification of voices in real environmental conditions with our instances. Our dataset
was named UQAC-Studs that stands for students of the Université du Québec à Chicoutimi.
Table 2. Results of the experiment based on the realized dataset: UQAC-Studs.
Quiet Environment Noisy Environment
Accuracy 91% 82%
Kappa 90% 80%
Total classes 11 11
Total instances for training 5 5
Total instances for identification 1 1
However, since it is impossible to state the reliability of the results we obtained with only such
data, we have constructed related datasets thanks to the Ted-LIUM and the TIMIT subset corpora as a
means of comparison for our system. For all 16 speakers, the TIMIT subset admits ten recorded files
between two and four seconds. Hence, we have exploited six samples to construct the training set,
and the four remaining were used for the identification. The results we obtained over this speech
corpus are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. Results obtained over a subset of the TIMIT speech corpus.
TIMIT Subset (16 Speakers)
Accuracy 83%
Kappa 82%
Total classes 16
Total instances for training 6
Total instances for identification 4
Nevertheless, since the Ted-LIUM speech corpus is large and contains several long records,
we judged that it was a necessity to unify the construction of the datasets according to the previously
described subset of TIMIT corpus. In that sense, we have created ten different training sets by selecting
16 samples randomly over the 1495 files. Moreover, we have also ensured that a sample was not chosen
more than once for a given batch. For each batch of ten records, every sample is split into 10 instances
of 5 s. In order to be more consistent with our experimental procedure, the first six instances are used
in the training phase; while the last four are exploited for the identification. Figure 9 details the results
obtained for these ten random batches. In addition, such an experiment has revealed a mean accuracy
of 87% and a mean kappa measure of 85%.
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Figure 9. Accuracy and kappa measures achieved by our system over the 10 random batches of the
Ted-LIUM corpus we have created.
However, as these evaluations involve a relatively small number of distinct classes, we point
out the analysis of the evolution of the kappa measure when increasing the number of classes.
The Ted-LIUM corpus let us perform such an appraisal since it is the largest corpus we used in
this research. Hence, we did not change the number of instances that we have exploited in the previous
evaluation, six instances per class for the training and four for the identification phase. We chose
to compute the kappa by increasing the number of classes exponentially until reaching the closest
value to the total of 1495 records. Figure 10 shows that the more there are classes, the more the kappa
measure tends to decrease. Indeed, our system obtains a kappa of 47% where the entire set of classes
was used in the identification process. Such a result was expected since we are not facing a binary
classification problem.
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Figure 10. Evolution of the kappa measure over the Ted-LIUM corpus when increasing the number of
classes exponentially.
Finally, an empirical comparison between our proposed method and previous works is exposed
in Table 4.
Table 4. Empirical comparison between our TiSA method and previous works.
Features Number ofFeatures
Classification,
Pattern Matching
(Training Complexity)
Accuracy Dataset Number ofSamples
Suggested method LPCCs 20 Naive Bayes(Onk)
91∼82%
87% (AVG)
83%
UQAC-Studs
Ted-LIUM
TIMIT (subset)
11
1462
16
Nair and Salam [19] LPCs and LPCCs 20, 30 and 40 DTW (On2 )
90.4% (20 LPCs)
94.8% (20 LPCCs) TIMIT 630
Reynolds and Rose [20] MFCCs 100 12-dimensionalvectors per second
GMM (may vary between
implementations to fit
the Gaussian model)
96.8%
80.8%
KING
Private samples 49
Kumar et al. [18]
LPCs, LPCCs,
RC, LAR,
ARCSIN and LSF
N.A.
ANN with
backpropagation
(Onmhkoi)
85.74% Private samples 25
5.4. Replay Attacks
Replay attacks refer to the presentation of a recorded audio sample of a genuine voice played back
to get access to the protected system [40]. Since this kind of attack is considered to be the major security
drawback of voice-based authentication mechanisms, it is relevant for us to state the robustness of
our system as it stands. Indeed, no specific method to counteract replay attacks such as [50] has been
implemented in this work.
In order to proceed with such an evaluation, the testing instance, for each participant of our
experiment, was replayed to the authentication system through a standard desktop computer speaker.
As expected, six utterances over the eleven were genuinely identified without the headset. However,
no fraudulent samples were correctly identified while using the headset, which has its own microphone
embedded.
5.5. Computation Performances Considerations
Since we desired to create a user-centred TiSA mechanism, we judge that an efficient, as well as
a reliable implementation is an important angle when considering to replace most used and weak
authentication mechanisms such as PIN codes.
To this end, we have chosen suitable techniques with attention to time complexity and memory
consumption. Figure 11 exposes a profiling of CPU, memory and battery utilization of the mobile
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device, in relation to the cumulative time consumption. These measurements were performed at every
stage of the training, as well as the identification processes, for one given instance of the dataset we
suggest. Moreover, the start stage was considered as an idle state for the application.
In order to produce six instances of ten seconds each, we had to record during 60 s.
Hence, the whole training process has required less than ten seconds of processing, while the
identification process has demanded less than 500 ms to terminate since we recorded during two
seconds. Moreover, the memory usage did not exceed 70 MB.
These measurements were observed through the Trepn Profiler application developed by
Qualcomm, but since accurate performance metrics are difficult to obtain, it is impossible for us
to provide a suitable analysis of the battery needs. Nevertheless, we only present a trend of the
required power consumption for the application.
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Figure 11. CPU, RAM, battery and time consumption, respectively expressed in %CPU, MB, mW and
seconds, over every stage of the experiment, where the first chart refers to the training process, and the
second is the identification.
5.6. Participants Opinion Considerations
Here, we report participants’opinions concerning the proposed system. Hence, it aims at better
understanding users’needs and habits as regards authentication in order to replace the present
mechanisms offered on mobile devices. This survey showed that two of the five users who have
enabled a knowledge-based authentication mechanism (i.e., PIN or pattern) have reported that it is
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overly repetitive and led them to make mistakes several times a day. Besides, all three fingerprints
users have mentioned a disturbing dysfunction with finger moisture. As a result, three participants
of the nine who locked their device as well as one of the two participants who did not employ such
security would use this system as a replacement of their present authentication scheme because of
its simplicity. Moreover, eight respondents have mentioned they could place their confidence in the
described system. However, the three remaining participants have declared that talking to their mobile
device could be annoying in public areas, and consequently, they have claimed that they do not trust
any voice-based authentication scheme. Nevertheless, these three participants have conceded that
a continuous authentication without even thinking about it was seductive, and they all declared that
they would be less worried to use, daily, a system that does not transmit data over the network (even
if they are encrypted).
5.7. Discussion
Firstly, based on the results we have obtained in previous sections, it is possible for us to observe that
the rate of correct identification remains consistent when our dataset is compared to the ones we have
built through both the Ted-LIUM and a subset of the TIMIT corpora. Moreover, these results are relatively
similar to the ones obtained by Kumar et al. [18], but not as good as the ones achieved by Nair and
Salam [19] as exposed in Table 4. Nevertheless, since we have also exploited LPCCs as discriminating
voice features, it is possible for us to say that our classification algorithm remains theoretically less
expensive than their DTW-based solution that involves quadratic time and space complexities. Due to
the use of LPCC features, comparing our technique directly with MFCCs-based ones is very limited.
However, according to the comparison detailed in Table 4, the results achieved by our proposed system
also are consistent with the work of Reynolds and Rose [20]. Moreover, the reliability of our proposed
system is acceptable, in real-life recording conditions, with a smaller number of classes than previous
works. However, that is the common use case of authentication mechanisms (i.e., the mobile device
owner and potentially one or two more people). The results obtained with fraudulent utterances of
speakers that participated in our experiment lead us to state that our system is perfectible in terms of
fraudulent access though replayed audio samples. However, the decision-making process suggested in
this work should significantly reduce the risks involved. Indeed, since none of the played-back samples
misled the authentication mechanisms when the headset is involved, attackers will only have access to
the content with a protected access that refers to non-critical pieces of information that mobile devices
may contain. Hence, by introducing the notion of access privileges, we also aim at reducing unsafe
situations in the case of false acceptance identifications.
Secondly, the participants’opinion collection allows us to state that our system could be a relevant
authentication mechanism for several users. In addition, since it is text independent, such a system,
with a few modifications, could perform the authentication in a continuous manner, without any
involvement from the user. In that sense, anxieties, as regards the discomfort in talking to a device
in public places, which were reported in the past may be reduced to nil. Therefore, we esteem that
such a technique might be a more significant option as part of a multilayer authentication. Moreover,
it should also be better employed as a more reliable fall-back solution in order to eradicate PIN codes.
6. Conclusions
In this research, we have proposed the design of a TiSA system for mobile devices with a specific
focus on its usability. This implementation operates as a stand-alone system that does not require
any network communications. Indeed, both training and identification phases, which are based on
LPCCs and the naive Bayes classifier, are achieved on the device itself. Moreover, we have enhanced
the identification thanks to a decision-making that substantially relies on user locations and the
presence of a headset. The results we have obtained over the different recognition analyses we have
performed demonstrate the reliability and the efficiency of our TiSA mechanism in both quiet and noisy
environments for a small set of persons (i.e., 90% and 80% of kappa in quiet and noisy environments,
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respectively, for eleven users). In addition, the resources consumption analysis performed in this work
shows the ability for the system to run on the weakest mobile devices.
We found that seven users were still not ready to switch from their present authentication
mechanism. Moreover, three of the participants have reported that they could not place their confidence
in such a system, as it may be disturbing when used in public places. However, since it is text
independent, legitimate users may be implicitly authenticated as they start speaking, insofar as the
mobile device is neither in their pocket, nor their bag (i.e., during a conversation). In that sense, since
the idea of being authenticated in a continuous manner was seducing to sceptical participants, we also
suggest that this technique should be either used in a multilayer authentication system or as a fall-back
mechanism, namely when the first one fails, to cover most of the users’needs and usages.
7. Future Works
Future works will focus on offering the application on the Google Play Store to better assess
the accuracy and the robustness of the proposed authentication system. However, the current
implementation will be adapted in order to let us track user authentication attempt outcomes and
locations. In this way, such a large-scale evaluation will provide more reliable results in front of real-life
condition usages, and the location-based decision will be better exploited and significant, as it was in
the experiment we have conducted in this research. Besides, the extraction of MFCCs discriminating
voice features will be considered in order to produce a direct comparison in terms of reliability and
effectiveness with LPCC features.
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The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
ANN Artificial Neural Network
AES American-English Speaker
ARCSIN Arcus Sin Coefficients
AVG Average
CDBN Convolutional Deep Belief Networks
CPU Central Processing Unit
DBFS Decibels Relative to Full Scale
DTW Dynamic Time Warping
EER Equal Error Rate
GMM Gaussian Mixture Model
HMM Hidden Markov Model
LAR Log Area Ratio
LPC Linear Prediction Coefficient
LPCC Linear Prediction Cepstral Coefficient
LSF Line Spectral Frequencies
MB Megabyte
MFCC Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficient
PCM Pulse-Code Modulation
PIN Personal Identification Number
RC Reflection coefficients
SPH NIST Sphere Format
TIMIT Texas Instruments and Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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TiSA Text independent Speaker Authentication
VAD Voice Activity Detection
VQ Vector Quantization
WAV Waveform Audio File Format
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